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COMMON SITUS PICKETING AND SECTION 8(b) (4) OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Prior to 1947, employer practices alone were regulated by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. -In that year, however, Congress passed
the Taft-Hartley Act,2 which served " to prescribe the legitimate
rights of both employeesand employers in their relations affecting com-
merce and to define and prescribe practices on the part of labor and
management which affect commerce. "
By section 8(b) (4) (A),' all union activities which forced any em-
ployer to cease doing business with any other employer were illegal.
Senator Taft, in discussing, the merits of that section, emphasized that
all the provision did was to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary
boycotts.5 Despite this glowing testimonial, many in Congress felt that
it so weakened the National Labor Relations Act, that it, in effect,
repealed it.6 It was reasoned that labor was placed in a precarious posi-
tion by having its most effective weapon-the right to strike-taken
away 7 Nevertheless, Congress passed the measure, subjecting it to ju-
dicial interpretation.
The biggest problem that faced the judiciary in trying to establish
1. 49 Star. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
2. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Star. 136 (1947).
3. Id.
4. id. at § 8(b) (4) (A), 61 Stat. 141. This section was amended and re-enacted by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, ch. 135, § 704, 73 Star. 542 as
§ 8(b) (4) (B). (To avoid confusion future reference to these sections will be made
as § 8(b) (4).)
5. 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947).
Thus it was made an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in a strike
against employer A for the purposes of forcing that employer to cease
doing business with employer B. Similarly, it would not be lawful for a
union to boycott employer A because A uses or otherwise deals in the
goods of, or does business with, employer B.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947).
6. It was stated that:
This provision is presumably designed to outlaw secondary boycotts and is
predicated on the assumption that all secondary boycotts are unjusti-
fied. In [some] situations the efforts of the unionized workers are
primarily directed at protecting their own organizations and their wage and
hour standards against the destructive competition of non-umon labor.
[This bill] indiscriminately bans all such boycotts, whether justified or not.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (Minority Report).
7. 93 CONG. REc. 6452 (1947)
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a concrete doctrine was to reflect the intent of the legislature. The
hearing on the bill presented no more than vague guidelines to follow
and prior history was of no avail, as employee practices had not been
regulated by the N.L.R.A. What this discussion proposes to do is to
examine the evolution of the system of regulation and control over
one of the more difficult areas of labor law-common situs picketing.
COMMON SITUS PICKETING
The right of employees to strike and picket, which is guaranteed
by the 'N.L.R.A., can take many forms. If, for example, a labor union
(U) has a dispute with its employer (C), it can register this protest
by striking C1 and picketing his place of employment. In this situation
U, acting at the situs of the dispute, is engaged in a primary strike
and picketing, legal activities under the Act."
Conversely, if U has a dispute with C1 and registers its complaint-by
picketing another employer (C2) with whom C, does business, this is
clearly a form of secondary pressure made illegal by the Act.9 In this
case the situs of the dispute is not at C2 where U set up its pickets, but
still at C1, the primary employer.
A third type of picketing may occur when both C and Ca are work-
ing on the same premises. In this situation a determination of where
the situs of the dispute is located is n6t. a vital factor, as no place is
exclusively occupied by one employer. What is important, however, is
the balancing of the two alternatives-the union's right to strike and
the right of the secondary employer to be free from the labor disputes
of another employer.10
8. See, e.g., Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 87 NLRB 937 (1949); Di Grorgio
Fruit Corp., 87 NLRB 720 (1949), enforced 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 869 (1951); Deena Artware, Inc., 86 NLRB 732 (1949), modified, 198 F.2d
645 (6th Gir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
9.See, e.g., Truck Drivers & Helpers, 111 NLRB 483 (1955), enforced, 228 F.2d 791
(5th Cir. 1956); Associated Musicians, 110 NLRB 2166 (1954), enforced, 226 F.2d 900
(2d Cir. 1955); United Brotherhood, 81 NLRB 802 (1949), enforced, 184 F.2d 60 (10th
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951).
There are two situations in which such activity has been held to be legal:
If during a strike or other dispute C1 contracts out its usual work to C2, the union
may picket C2 under the "ally theory" by which the primary premises is said to extend
to C2 . See Truck Drivers Union v.-NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Business Mach. Mechanics, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962
(1956); Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
A union may also picket C2 to induce customers of C2 not to buy goods which were
obtained from C. See NLRB v Fruit & Vegetable Packers Union; 377 U.S. 58 (1964);
contra, Honolulu Typographical Union v. NLRB, 167 NLRB No. 150, - F.2d - (1968).
10. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
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This form of picketing, called common situs picketing, may be sub-
divided into two parts: when C1 conducts normal business at C2, and
when C2 performs duties at Ci.
The first part has been characterized as ambulatory or roving sims
picketing" since the U will only picket when C1 is at C2. The latter
has been called constant situs picketing 2 since the U will picket the
premises of C1, whether C2 would be present or not.
A. Ambulatory or Roving Situs Picketing
Two years after the passage of Taft-Hardey, the National Labor
Relations Board had an opportunity to consider the relationship of sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) to the roving situs problem. In International Brotherhood
of Teamsters (Shultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.),13 a New York union,
after the employer had moved operations to New Jersey, picketed
the employer's trucks when they made deliveries in New York. When-
ever the employer's trucks would appear, the union would form picket
lines, informing the public of the nature of the dispute. The Board
rejected the charge of an unfair labor practice, basing its decision on
two factors:
1. New York was the best place to effectively advertise the dis-
pute.14 (Emphasis added.)
2. Union limited picketing to the time and place that the employ-
er's trucks were present.' 5
11. See generally Kovarsky, The Supreme Court and the Secondary Boycott, 16 LAB.
L.J. 216 (1965); Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLuM. L. Rxv.
1363 (1962); Note, Intermittent and Constant Common Situs Picketing, 36 IND. L.J.
203 (1961).
12. This is to be distinguished from a situation in which the employees of a secondary
employer occasionally go on the premises of the primary employer for making deliveries
or picking up merchandise. This type of picketing has been classified as primary and
thus not prohibited by the Act.
13. 87 NLRB 502 (1949).
14. Id. at 506.
In view of the roving nature of its business, the only effective means of
bringing direct pressure on Shultz was the type of picketing engaged in by
the Respondent. It would have been pointless, indeed, of the union to
establish a picket line at the New Jersey terminal and allow Shultz to
carry on its extensive business activities in New York City....
15. The emphasis of this point can readily be seen in a case the following year, in
which the Board held it to be a violation of section 8(b) (4) for a union to establish
an ambulatory or roving situs picket before the employer's trucks came and after the




This rationale is important, not only because it represents the Board's
initial effort in trying to interpret logically the significance of the
1947 Act, but also because it set the stage for the decision in Sailor's
Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock).:"
In that case the ship S.S. Propho was in port for repairs. The union,
which had a dispute with the owner of the ship, attempted to picket
the ship at its berth. When the Moore Dry Dock Company refused to
allow the pickets on the premises, the union picketed outside the gates
of the shipyard. The Board in its decision established four evidentiary
standards for picketing in such situations. If the standards were met, a
presumption of valid picketing arose.
1. The picketing must be limited to times when the situs of the
dispute was located on the secondary premises.
2. The primary employer must be engaged in his normal business
at the sims.
3. The picketing must take place reasonably close to the sims.
4. The picketing must clearly disclose that the dispute was only
with the primary employer. 17
These tests were widely accepted by the federal courts in their review
of Board decisions, as well as by the Board itself."8
One of the primary tests enunciated in Shultz-the place of picketing
was the best place to advertise the dispute-was ignored by the Board
in Moore." Subsequently, however, the Board in Bre'wery & Beverage
Drivers (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.)20 recognized this
test as an addition to the Moore rules. The facts were similar to Shultz,
in that the union followed the employer's trucks and picketed them
when they attempted to make deliveries. The Board held that where
the primary employer has a permanent place of business, picketing
16. 92 NLRB 547 (1950).
17. Id. at 549.
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 55, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Chauffeurs,
Teamsters, 212 F.2d 216 (7th Cit. 1954); NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d
65 (2d Cir. 1951).
19. Although Shultz permitted picketing at the secondary premesis in New York
despite the existence of a place of business in New Jersey, the main thrust rested on
the effect of such picketing in furthering the union objectives. In International Bhd.
of Boiler Makers (Richfield Oil Co.), 95 NLRB 1191 (1951), the Board in finding an
unfair labor practice when the union picketed the premises of the secondary employer
hinted that this place was not the most effective place for the union to picket.
20. 107 NLRB 299 (1953), enforced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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must be done at that place or else it would be a violation of the Act.2 1
Although it would appear to be an accommodation of Moore, the
Board distinguished the cases by an emphasis upon the employer's
permanent place of business. Regardless of its adherence to the Moore
standards, the Board found the Union in violation of the Act in its
picketing of a secondary situs when the employer had a permanent place
of business.2 In a series of later cases, the Board demonstrated its
reliance on the rationale in Washington rather than on Moore, when a
permanent place of business was present.23
In addition to this mechanistic adherence to the rationale of Washing-
ton, the Board continued rigidly to apply the Moore standards when
no permanent place of business was present. Numerous acts were con-
tinually cited by the Board as inferences of this unlawful activity:
Statements by union representatives that picketing was designed to
induce employees of secondary employers to cease work; requests to
secondary employers that they stop dealing with the primary em-
ployer; failure to observe the Moore rules with respect to space; pub-
licity and time; actual stoppages of work by the employees of the
secondary employer; direct appeals to the employees of the secondary
employer; and silence as to the nature of the picketing.24
This mechanical approach, however, was not to be free from criti-
cism. 25 In Sales Drivers Union (Campbell Coal Co.),26 the court ig-
21. Brewery & Beverage Drivers (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.), 107
NLRB 299, 303 (1953).
22. It would appear that if the primary employer had a permanent place of business,
Washington could not be applied, as this would deny the union its right to strike. See
Wilson Teaming Co., 140 NLRB 164 (1962); Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd., 139 NLRB
216 (1962); cf. NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951).
23. See, e.g., Commission House Drivers Union (Euclid Foods, Inc.), 118 NLRB 130
(1957); Local 117, United Glassworkers (Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc.), 117 NLRB 622
(1957); United Steelworkers (Barry Controls, Inc.), 116 NLRB 1470 (1956), enforced,
250 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1957); Sheet Metal Workers (W.H. Arthur Co.), 115 NLRB 1137
(1956).
24. Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-Another Chapter,
59 CoLuM. L. REv. 125, 141 (1959).
25. In assailing the Board's application of the Moore rules, as disregarding the intent
of Congress, it was said: "The Moore Dry Dock criteria were developed as eviden-
tiary tests, not of the 'unlawful objective' but in order to determine whether the picket-
ing was primary or secondary. . . ." Note, Conmon Situs Rules Fade Away as NLRB
and Courts Look to Object of Union's Picketing in Taft-Hartley Section 8(b) (4) (A)
Cases, 45 Gno. LJ. 614, 623 (1957).
26. 110 NLRB 2192 (1954), enforced, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 972 (1956).
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nored the Board's ruling that there had been an unfair labor practice
merely because the primary employer had a permanent place of busi-
ness and the union picketed at the secondary employer. The court
found no violation as the picketing only incidentally effected employ-
ees of secondary employers working at a common site. To be a vio-
lation, the court held that it must be shown that an object of the union's
actions was directed at those employees.27 Despite this ruling, the Board
continued to apply Washington, although its application was ap-
parently sub silento.
In non-Washington cases, the Board began slowly to apply the Moore
standards with increased flexibility. At first, the tests were met if the
pickets merely refrained from trying to induce neutrals from dealing
with the struck employer.28 Later, as a more literal approach to the
Act developed, the Board in fact examined the picketing to learn if
an object of such picketing was to induce neutrals not to trade with
the employer, whether such object was achieved or not.29 This in-
creased flexibility eventually influenced the Board to modify the Wash-
ington decision in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 861 (Plauche Electric)3" in 1962. In that case, the Board held
that the existence of a permanent place of business was just another
factor in discovering whether the union was engaging in an unfair
labor practice.31 As it exists today, this modified approach has the ap-
proval of both the Board and the courts.
B. Constant Situs Picketing
Although a literal reading of the N.L.R.A. appears to outlaw all
forms of boycotts and pickets, the legislative history of the Act
makes it clear that primary actions are not condemned.32  As with
27. 229 F.2d at 517.
28. See, e.g., Amarillo Drivers Union (Crowe-Gulde Cement Co.), 122 NLRB 1275,
aff'd, 273 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1959); General Drivers Union (Caradine Co.), 116 NLRB
1559 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1958).
29. See, e.g., United Ass'n of Journeymen (Bishop Plumbing & Elec. Co.), 126
NLRB 1142 (1960); Journeymen Barbers Union (Chicago & Ill. Hairdressers Ass'n.),
120 NLRB 936 (1958) (alternative holding).
30. 135 NLRB 250 (1962); accord, Teamsters Local 222 (Utah Sand & Gravel
Product s Corp.), 148 NLRB 118 (1964); Hotel, Motel & Clerks Employee Union, Local
568, 135 NLRB 567 (1962); Plumbers & Pipe FittersLocal 471, 135 NLRB 329 (1962).
31.IBEW Local 861 (Plauche Elec.), 135 NLRB 250, 254 (1962).
32. See Lesnick, supra note 11, at 1398 (1962), where the author states:
The major supports, in the statute as enacted in 1947, for the rejection of
the-literal approach to sectionf 8(b) (4) have been sections 7 and 13., Sec-
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the roving situs problems, the first constant situs case came before the
Board in 1949.
In Oil Workers (Pure Oil Co.) 33 the union had a contract dispute
with the primary employer and picketed his premises. The secondary
employer, who occupied the same premises, refused to cross the picket
lines and the union was charged with an unfair labor practice. The
Board rejected this contention, stating that: "A strike, by its very
nature, inconveniences those who customarily do business with the
struck employer. . . .It does not follow that such . ..is therefore
prescribed by the [Act]. .... 34
This doctrine became the basis for the primary situs rationale; a ra-
tionale which infrequently recognized that picketing at the primary
situs could be secondary in nature.
The extent to which this presumption was carried, even in these
first years, was evidenced in United Electrical Workers (Ryan Con-
struction Corp.)35 The union picketed a separate gate, which was
used by the employees of the secondary employer. It is apparent that
in this situation the union was directly interfering with the activities
of a second employer, and not just incidentally affecting them. Never-
theless, the Board, with relative ease, disposed of the problem in favor
of the striking union:
When picketing is wholly at the premises of the employer with
whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute, it cannot be called
"secondary" even though, as is virtually always the case, an object
of that picketing is to dissuade all persons from entering such
premises for business reasons.36 (Emphasis added.)
tion 7 purports to guarantee labor the right to engage in concerted activi-
ties, including strikes and picketing, for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection, and section 13 permits inroads on that right only as specifically
provided in the Act.
In 1959 the inclusion of the "primary strike and picketing" provision made that
intention clearer:
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (b) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing.
73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1964).
33. 84 NLRB 315 (1949).
34. Id. at 318. For later cases which uphold this general principle see Milwaukee
Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960); Teamsters Local 317 (Iroquois
Door Co.), 132 NLRB 1101 (1961).
35. 85 NLRB 417 (1949).
36. Id. at 418. See generally Farmer, Secondary Boycotts-Loopholes Closed or
Reopened, 52 GEo. L.J. 392 (1964).
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It became apparent, as the Board continued to apply these standards
to the primary situs picketing, that such an approach was both il-
logical and unsatisfactory. By virtue of an unrealistic fiat, the Board
wholly ignored possible unlawful activity by the union in picketing
at the primary premises.
In 1951, either reacting to this unsatisfactory condition or evolving
a new postulate based on four years of experience with the Act, the
Supreme Court in International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB37 shifted
slightly from this previous intransigent position. In that case, the union's
picketing of the premises of a primary employer had the effect of
stopping the trucks of a neutral employer. The Court, in holding the
union activities to be legal implementations of policy, stated that the
stoppage of neutral trucks was merely an incidental effect of legal
picketing. The object of picketing was to prevent the operation of
the primary employer and in no way was there a concerted effort on
the part of the union to stop the work of the neutral employer.3 8
The Court was examining the provisions of section 8 (b) (4), which
made it an unfair labor practice for a union "to engage in, or to in-
duce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment... . , 39
They determined that even in applying this new test, the union's activi-
ties were not violative of the Act as they were directed toward indi-
viduals and were not "concerted" within the meaning of the Act.40
This movement away from a strict primary-secondary dichotomy
was accepted, although some cases still adhered to the older philosophy.4 1
The one area of labor law which was influenced by this change the
most was the construction industry. Even before the passage of Taft-
Hartley, the N.L.R.B. refused to take jurisdiction in cases dealing
with that industry.42 Although the reason for such refusal was un-
37. 84 N.L.R.B. 360 (1949), rev'd, 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cit. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 665
(1951).
38.341 U.S. at 670. It is important to note that the Board's determination rested on
the primary situs doctrine, while the Supreme Court rested its finding on a literal in-
terpretation of section 8 (b) (4).
39. 49 Star. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
40. See generally Koretz, supra note 24; Note, supra note 25. In IBEW Local 3
(Surf Hunter Elec. Co.), 172 NLRB No. 115 (1968), similar logic was used to defeat an
employer's claim. The Board said that there was no concerted activity toward the
workers, but the union's objectives were towards the public alone.
41. See, e.g, District 50, UMW (Marion Mach. Works), 112 NLRB 348 (1955);
General Teamsters Union (Crump, Inc.), 112 NLRB 311 (1955).
42. See Johns-Manville Corp. (Home Insulator's Union), 61 NLRB 1 (1945); Brown
Shipbuilding Co., 57 NLRB 326 (1944); Brown & Root, Inc, 51 NLRB 820 (1943).
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clear, apparently the temporary nature of the industry, where a union's
presence at a job site would only last until the task was completed,
made the designation of an appropriate bargaining unit difficult and
the issuance of cease and desist orders ineffective.4 3 Taft-Hartley did
not solve this problem, as nothing in the legislative history of section
8 (b) (4) indicated the congressional attitude toward it.44
It was not until 1951, after Rice Milling had established a new stan-
dard based on "concerted activity," that the Supreme Court brought
the construction industry under the guise of section 8 (b) (4). In NLRB
v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council,45 union con-
tractors picketed a construction project, protesting the employment
of non-union contractors. When the general contractor fired the non-
union contractor, the union was charged with an unfair labor practice.
The court of appeals refused to enforce the Board's order, 6 stating
that the situation involved a primary employer and, therefore, there
was no violation of the Act. This reasoning, although on the surface
based on the rejected primary situs rationale, actually recognized the
unique nature of the construction industry, in that it was denied the
more conventional means of persuading workers to organize and was
thus forced to rely on the strike.47
The Supreme Court, however, recognizing that an object of the
union's activities was to force the general contractor to cease doing
business with the sub-contractor, upheld the Board's decision. The Court,
over the dissent of Justice Douglas, ignored the special nature of the
construction industry and subjected it to the same standards of com-
mon situs picketing as the other industries.
With the apparent demise of the primary situs doctrine and the ad-
vent of the Moore rules with respect to roving situs picketing, the Board
43. Note, The Import of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building & Construction In-
dustry, 60 YALEn L.J. 673 (1951).
44. It is illuminating to reflect that the record of the Taft-Hardey Act de-
bates 20 years ago, discloses that almost every reference to boycotts involved
plant and retail situations .... None of the proponents of section 8 (b) (4)
talked about the construction industry or common situs picketing on con-
struction jobs.
Hearings on H.R. 100 Before Subcommittee on Labor of the House Conmittee on
Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967).
45. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
46. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326 (1950).
47. 341 U.S. 675, 692-93 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also 100 U. PA. L. Rrv. 141,
144 (1951).
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was faced with the dilemma of the application of these rules to con--
stant situs situations. A definitive determination of this problem- 'did
not occur until 1954 in the case of Local 55, Carpenters Council (Pro-
fessional and Businessmen's Life Ins. Co.). 48 A similar fact situation
developed as in Denver, with a union picketing a construction site.
In rejecting any remnants of the ownership test, the Board emphasized
that the union violated the fourth requirement of the Moore rules in
that the picketing did not clearly direct itself toward the primary
employer, but went beyond to the employees of secondary employers.
4 9
As in the evolution of acceptable standards in the roving situs prob-
lem, the Board struggled to articulate a workable interpretation of the
Act with an interplay of the Moore rules. Subsequently, the Board
developed the yardstick that picketing at the primary employer would
be legal, if the union made a bona fide effort to minimize its impact.
on neutrals." Thus the Board attempted to balance both the union's
rights and the secondary employer's rights.
With this uniformity, the question arose whether picketing at a re-
served gate would come under the rules. In such a situation, a second-
ary employer is performing work on the premises of a primary em-
ployer, as in a typical constant situs situation. What is distinguishing,
however, is that the employees of. the secondary employer have a
separate gate, which they alone use. Early Board decisions held such
picketing to be violative of the Act; however, with the modified ap-
proach that was developing, the question again was presented in United
Steel'workers (Phelps Dodge Refining Co.)Y1 The court of appeals held
in 1961 that such picketing would be unlawful under the secondary
picketing provisions of the Act if the gate is separate, marked and
set apart from the other gates; the work done by the men who use the
gate is unrelated to the normal operations of the employer; and the
work is of a kind that would not, if done when the plant is engaged
in its regular operations, necessitate curtailing those operations.5 2
Subsequently in two later cases,13 the Court emphasized this related
48. 108 NLRB 363, enforced, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954).
49. Id. at 367-70.
50. Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks Union (Crystal Palace), 116 NLRB 856 (1956),
enforced, 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957); see also Seafarers Int'l Union (Salt Dome Pro-
duction Co.) v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Local 618, Automotive Employees
Union (Incorporated Oil Co.), 116 NLRB 1844 (1956).
51. 126 NLRB 1367 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1961).
52. Id. at 595.
53. Local 5895, United Steelworkers (Carrier Corp.) v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964);
19681
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work concept. It was inclined, however, to modify the standards in
Phelps to hold that even if the work was related within the purview
of the second requirement, there would be no violation of the Act
if such work were de minimis.
With the related work concept solidfying, the proponents of its
applicability to the construction industry brought a test case before
the court in 1967. In Building & Construction Trades Council (Max-
well & Hartz)," union employees picketed a general contractor who
hired non-union workers. Even after separate gates were established,
the union continued to picket. The union argued that by the related
work concept, all the employees became allies instead of neutrals 55
and, if this were the case, the picketing would be primary instead of
secondary. The Board refused to apply the related work concept and
found a violation of the Act56 On petition for enforcement, the court
supported the Board in its finding that the related work concept was
not applicable to the construction industry and if any change in the
law was to occur, it was for the legislature and not the judiciary.5
Subsequent cases have upheld the ruling of the court.58 It appears,
therefore, that any attempt to alter the law in this field will not be
able to hurdle the Denver case. Although the related work concept
was applicable to other industries, that concept appears inapplicable
to the construction industry.
CONCLUSION
The historical approach outlined above clearly demonstrates the
struggle of the Board and the courts to develop a workable philosophy
with respect to common situs picketing. It represents an attempt to
Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers (General Elec.) v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
54. 383 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1967).
55. If they were neutrals then it would be possible to find some unlawful secondary
activity. If, on the other hand, they were considered allies, then all parties would be
considered as one. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951) (dissenting opinion).
56. 164 NLRB No. 50 (1966).
57. 383 F.2d at 56. For a concise history of the various attempts by Congress to amend
Taft-Hartley, so as to overrule the effect of the Denver decision, see Hearings on H.R.
100 Before Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). See also Note, Common Situs Picketing and the Con-
struction Industry, 54 GEO. L.J. 962, 976-89 (1966), where the author analyzes section
by section the 1965 proposal, which was almost identical to that considered in H.R. 100.
58. See Operating Engineers Local 701 (Cascade Employment Ass'n), 172 NLRB
No. 127 (1968); Nashville Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (H.E. Collins Constr. Co.),
172 NLRB No. 105 (1968).
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balance the alternatives of the union's right to strike and a secondary,
employer to be free from the disputes of another employer with the
intention of Congress, as mirrored in the various labor acts. As it has
developed the following may be concluded:
1. The Board and the courts no longer consider the primary
situs per se as conclusive of lawful activity.
2. Conversely, all activities at the secondary premises are not,
illegal.
3. The Moore tests represent a flexible index of activities
which must be done in order to make such secondary
activities lawful.
4. The Washington doctrine, once rigidly interpreted, has
been reduced to one of the evidentiary factors in analyz-
ing the Moore criteria.
5. In picketing at a separate gate, the Phelps criteria, as modi-
fied by General Electric and Carrier Corp., are taken as
determinative of lawful activity.
6. The construction industry is still forced to work under
the stigma of Denver, as neither the Congress nor the
courts are willing to alter it.
This development has been a slow process. Even the enunciation of
the seemingly solid test of Moore did not escape the microscopic
dissection and modification by the Board and the courts. Similarly, the
attempt by the construction industry to overrule the Denver decision
has been stalled in Congress for over eighteen years. Consequently, no
radical departures from this current philosophy can be expected, as
both the courts and the legislatures are unwilling to alter concrete doc-
trine in this complex labor field.
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